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I. Introduction
The Copyright Alert System represents the newest venture by
the contemporary intermediary regime to intensify copyright
enforcement. In July 2011, the Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”) and the Motion Picture Association of America
(“MPAA”) signed an agreement with five major national internet
service providers (“ISPs”)—AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast, Time
Warner Cable, and Verizon. This Memorandum of Understanding
(“MOU”) details the creation of a Copyright Alert System (“CAS”),
a new and entirely private mechanism for copyright enforcement.
Under CAS, content rightsholders—composed most prominently of
the RIAA and MPAA—monitor and notify ISPs of any internet
protocol addresses (“IP addresses”) participating in peer-to-peer file
sharing. The ISPs utilize this information, and by referencing the
customer registered to that IP address at the alleged time, issue the
customer a Copyright Alert.
Alerts are graduated, with
accompanying penalties that increase in severity.
Prior to CAS, content rightsholders embarked on legal and
legislative campaigns that, although highly successful in the courts,
resulted
in
significant
normative
backlash—producing
counterproductive results of continued file sharing and infringement.
With the signing of the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of
Understanding, content rightsholders seemed poised to make that
same mistake again.
However, in a prime example of “normative avoision,” content
rightsholders have finally taken note of the normative consequences
of their enforcement methods and, through subsequent changes to
CAS, have deftly sidestepped the normative backlash dilemma.
Content rightsholders have created a split enforcement regime that
focuses litigation on frequent file sharers with deeply internalized
pro-sharing norms, and pro-copyright education on nascent to
moderate file sharers who have not yet deeply internalized prosharing norms. In light of content rightsholders recent litigation and
legislative campaign debacles, the Copyright Alert System represents
a new leaf for their pro-copyright efforts.

II. Background
A. Normative Backlash

In Copyright Backlash, Professor Ben Depoorter argues that
punitive enforcement of copyright infringement statutes creates a
normative backlash effect by strengthening anti-copyright positions:
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[C]opyright enforcement is a double-edged sword. While
stringent sanctions have a modest deterrent effect on filesharing behavior, they increase anti-copyright sentiments
among frequent offenders. This raises a spectacular challenge
for copyright enforcement: the more copyright owners push to
step up sanctions for copyright infringements, the more the
public resents the protected rights. Consequently, stepping up
sanctions tends to increase—rather than decrease—the rate and
1
frequency of infringing activities.

Professor Depoorter likens the conditions that copyright law
faces today to those encountered at times in the past, such as under
2
Prohibition the early twentieth century. The concept of a normative
backlash can be summed up as follows: where noncompliance is
widespread, effective deterrence can only be obtained by raising
enforcement to levels that undermine the support for the underlying
3
rules. A slightly different formulation highlights the normative
elements in a backlash scenario: “[w]hen behavior is driven by
normative viewpoints, imposing laws that are perceived as ‘unjust’ or
‘illegitimate’ [may] reinforce and strengthen the underlying
4
opposition against those laws.”
The public may, for example,
perceive laws as unjust if the associated sanctions seem excessive in
5
relation to the punished behavior.
Under these conditions,
enforcement has the unintended and counterproductive effect of
moving behavior in the opposite direction from that intended by the
6
law.
Professor Depoorter applies the normative backlash structure to
modern copyright enforcement and finds that content rightsholders’
deterrence-based
litigation
approach
will
likely
prove
7
counterproductive to the goals of copyright holders.
Professor
Depoorter finds the necessary elements for normative backlash
present in the widespread noncompliance fueled by normative
viewpoints, in the heightened legal campaign against noncommercial

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2011).
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1256.
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users, and in the public’s “adverse reaction to the strict enforcement
8
of copyright law.”
First, noncompliance is widespread in the online file sharing
context. A 2003 Gallup Poll survey found that 83% of teenagers
9
believed sharing digital music was morally acceptable. At the same
time, a substantial portion of the public views the current statutory
damages framework as excessive, unjust, and punitive—far above and
10
beyond actual compensatory damages.
For example, in Sony BMG
Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, a graduate student was ordered
11
to pay $675,000 for sharing 30 songs—$22,500 per song. In Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, a single mother was ordered to pay
12
$1.92 million for sharing 24 songs.
Yet despite these sky-high
13
penalties, file sharing has continued, largely unabated. A 2011 study
by Sandvine reports that BitTorrent is still responsible for 21.6% of
14
residential Internet traffic in North America. Compare this to the
15
top result for residential Internet traffic—Netflix at 22.2%, and it
16
becomes apparent that online infringement has not slowed. Thus,

8.
9.

Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1266
Steven Hanway & Linda Lyons, Teens OK With Letting Music Downloads Play,
GALLUP POLL, Sept. 30, 2003, available at http:// www.gallup.com/poll/9373/teens-lettingmusic-downloads-play.aspx.
10. See Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive
Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53
(2009). But see Colin Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant
Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010) (arguing that the statutory damages framework was not
intended to be punitive but remunerative of actual damages).
11. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 489 (1st Cir. 2011).
12. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. Minn.
2010).
13. See Simon Crerar, Illegal File-Sharing As Popular As Ever, TIMES (London), Jan.
19, 2006, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/music/article2418137.ece;
Enigmax, File-Sharing Prospers Despite Tougher Laws, TORRENTFREAK.COM (May 22,
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharing-prospers-despite-tougher-laws-120522.
14. Janko Roettgers, Sorry, Hollywood: Piracy may make a comeback, GIGAOM.COM
(Aug. 11, 2011, 2:02 PM), http://www.gigaom.com/2011/08/11/file-sharing-is-back
(“[P]iracy never actually declined. It just didn’t grow as fast as other types of media
consumption.”). Netflix is the single largest source of Internet traffic on North America’s
fixed access networks at 22.2%. Id; see also Sandvine, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA
SPOTLIGHT NORTH AMERICA, FIXED ACCESS, SPRING 2011 at 2, available at http://www.
wired.com/images_blogs/business/2011/05/SandvineGlobalInternetSpringReport2011.pdf
[hereinafter “Sandvine Report”].
15. Sandvine Report at 2.
16. Mike Masnick, File Sharing Continues To Grow, Not Shrink, TECHDIRT.COM
(Aug. 12, 2011, 11:45 AM), www.techdirt.com/articles/20110812/01061715485/file-sharing-
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noncompliance has been, and continues to be, widespread in the
online infringement context.
Second, over the past decade, content rightsholders, most
notably the entertainment industry, have waged a largely successful
legal campaign to heighten the enforcement and punishment for
online copyright infringement. In a series of high-profile decisions,
content rightsholders have persuaded courts “to accept expansive
interpretations of contributory enforcement, to create novel doctrines
of copyright infringement, and to apply broad interpretations of
17
statutory damage provisions.”
According to copyright backlash
theory, it is the very success of this legal campaign, and the everhigher sanctions it imposes on the public, that may fuel a
counterproductive normative backlash.
In Copyright Backlash, Professor Depoorter conducted a number
of experimental studies to explore the potential for counterproductive
18
normative effect on various types of infringers.
By varying the
19
probability and severity of monetary sanctions, Professor Depoorter
determined that a counterproductive effect on pro-copyright
sentiments existed in relation to the probability and severity of
20
sanctions.
Increasing either the probability or the severity of
sanctions produced a counterproductive effect. Moreover, increasing
both the probability and severity of sanctions produced a “powerful
21
counterproductive effect, increasing anti-copyright norms.” Finally,
Professor Depoorter found that elevated sanctions have a stronger
effect on deterrence than increasing the probability of sanctions.
Significantly, however, elevated sanctions also generated greater
22
backlash effects.
Because the marginal benefits of increasing the severity of
punishment is greater than the equivalent increase in the probability
of punishment, Professor Depoorter suggests that it will be more
financially efficient for content rightsholders to increase the severity
continues-to-grow-not-shrink.shtml (“None of the actions taken by the industry appear to
have slowed down infringement online. Instead, it appears that it just keeps growing.”).
17. Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1251. This article explores the successful
litigation campaign and the concept of legal overdeterrence below in Part II.B.
18. Id. at 1279–80.
19. Id. at 1280.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (“[H]igh-severity/low-probability enforcement conditions generate higher
backlash effects as well as higher levels of deterrence than low-severity/high-probability
enforcement—even though, interestingly, both enforcement regimes impose identical
expected costs.”).
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23

of sanctions. However, in what Professor Depoorter dubs “the irony
of deterrence,” increasing the severity of sanctions also strengthens
24
anti-copyright norms in the public.
Professor Depoorter’s concluding remarks offer a potential
solution to content rightsholders: “[E]nforcement efforts would likely
be more effective if targeted specifically to different types of
copyright offenders. . . . By focusing litigation on frequent offenders,
copyright holders bolster anti-copyright norms among this group,
while foregoing opportunities to promote pro-copyright norms among
25
occasional infringers.”
And indeed, content rightsholders have
taken the concept of normative backlash to heart when developing
26
and implementing the Copyright Alert System.
B. The Litigation Campaign by Content Rightsholders

Content rightsholders have largely succeeded in ratcheting everhigher copyright enforcement within the court system. First, content
rightsholders have expanded the scope of copyright protection
through intermediary liability. Second, content rightsholders, and in
particular the RIAA and MPAA, have aggressively pursued
individuals for what historically has been deemed noncommercial
copying. Finally, content rightsholders have prevailed upon courts to
apply expansive and severe statutory penalties against these private
27
individuals for online copyright infringement.
First, content rightsholders have greatly expanded the scope of
copyright protection through intermediary liability. When online file
sharing became prevalent in the late 1990s, the legality of online,
noncommercial file sharing was still uncertain. In the pivotal case of
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit departed from
conventional noncommercial fair use theory to find Napster users
28
directly infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights. Once the court found
that noncommercial file sharing by private users could qualify as
direct infringement, the path was inevitably paved towards
intermediary liability for the developers of file sharing platforms.
The Ninth Circuit found the developers of the Napster software liable

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1286.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1289.
See infra Part V.
See generally Depoorter, et al., supra note 1.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
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under a theory of contributory liability. By centrally hosting the
database of shared files on its users’ computers, Napster provided the
“site and facilities” enabling the direct infringement, and therefore
“materially contributed” to their users’ copyright infringement.
The Supreme Court would expand the bounds of intermediary
30
liability even further in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. In
Grokster, the defendant did not centrally host files or databases that
would qualify as the “site and facilities” necessary to meet the
31
contributory liability test under Napster. Nonetheless, the Court
found the intermediary liable by creating a novel doctrine of
32
Under this new inducement theory, the Court held
inducement.
that mere distribution of software with the intent to promote copyright
33
infringement creates secondary infringement liability.
Second, content rightsholders have aggressively pursued
individuals for what historically has been deemed noncommercial
copying. As online file sharing continued to skyrocket in the early
2000s, the RIAA began targeting the individual users of file sharing
technologies and doing so en masse. In September 2003, the RIAA
began sending subpoenas to file sharers via their ISPs, eventually
34
settling most cases via pre-litigation letters for approximately $3,000.
By 2008, the RIAA sued roughly 35,000 persons for online file
35
sharing. The MPAA entered the fray in 2004 when it launched its
36
The litigation campaign
own lawsuits against individual sharers.
against individuals thus seems to have grown exponentially. For
example, in 2012, one movie studio sued almost 25,000 individual
37
users in a single case.

29. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1020.
30. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
31. Id. at 919–20.
32. Id. at 936–37.
33. Id. (“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”).
34. Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1260.
35. See Ethan Smith & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Ganging Up on Internet Pirates
Hollywood:
Telecom
Providers
Unite
to
Target
Those
Who
Share
Copyrighted Films, WSJ.COM (July 8 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303365804576432270822271148.
36. Fred Locklear, MPAA lawsuits target BitTorrent, eDonkey and Direct Connect
networks, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 14, 2004, 5:33 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
uncategorized/2004/12/4467-2/.
37. Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, ‘Hurt Locker’ Studio Sues 2,514 Over Copyright
Infringement, PCWORLD.COM (Apr. 24, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/
article/254381/hurt_locker_sue_2_514_over_copyright_infringement.html
(“Voltage
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Contents rightsholders have also hurdled considerable obstacles
in obtaining judgments against individuals. The evidentiary issue of
proving that a file in a shared folder was actually downloaded from
the alleged file sharer’s computer is one such example. However, the
courts haven given short shrift to the issue by ruling that
38
dissemination could be presumed based on mere accessibility. This
evidentiary presumption enabled content rightsholders to pursue a
number of questionable claims. For example, in 2005 the RIAA sued
a deceased 83-year-old woman whose daughter alleged she “hated
39
computers.” As a result of these and other actions, critics have
characterized content rightsholders’ litigation campaigns as akin to
40
blackmail, extortion, and harassment.
Finally, content rightsholders have prevailed upon courts to
interpret statutory damage provisions exceedingly broadly against
private individuals for online copyright infringement. The Copyright
Act provides for copyright holders to elect for statutory damages at
41
any time during litigation. For “willful infringement” of registered
works, a court may increase the award of damages to a sum of
42
$150,000 per instance of infringement of a copyrighted work. By
convincing courts to interpret “willful infringement” broadly, content
rightsholders have successful obtained astonishingly high damages
43
against online file sharers. For example, one individual was ordered
to pay $1.92 million for sharing 24 songs and another $675,000 for 30
44
songs.
Here too, content rightsholders have handily overcome
evidentiary issues of damages through alternative statutory damages.

Pictures, the movie studio that gained its fame by producing the Academy Award-winning
film “The Hurt Locker” and targeting 24,583 BitTorrent users in a piracy-related lawsuit
last year, is on another copyright infringement crusade.”); see also Voltage Pictures, LLC
v. Vazquez, 277 F.R.D. 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2011) (action brought against named defendants
and Does 1–24,583).
38. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
39. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (U.K.) (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30
AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead/.
40. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, The “Legal Blackmail” Business: Inside a
P2P-Settlement Factory, WIRED (Oct. 3, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.
wired.com/epicenter/2010/10/the-legal-blackmail-business.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
42. Id.
43. See generally Kate Cross, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning
Substantial Judgments Against Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1031, 1042 (2010).
44. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 660 F.3d at 490; Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at
1050.
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For instance, a traditional damages analysis might be nuanced enough
to inquire into how many times a file was downloaded and whether a
download correlates to a lost sale for the rightsholder. Such an
analysis, though complex because of the nature of online file sharing,
would be strongly indicative of the actual harm to the copyright
45
holder.

III. The Copyright Alert System
A. Memorandum of Understanding

On July 6, 2011, a group of content rightsholders—the MPAA,
46
the RIAA, an association of independent record labels, and a
47
number of film production companies —met with five of the largest
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)—AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast,
Time Warner Cable, and Verizon—and signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”) that outlined a Copyright Alert System
(“CAS”) designed to combat online peer-to-peer file sharing (“P2P”
48
file sharing). Under the CAS MOU, content owners identify and
notify ISPs of infringing Internet Protocol addresses (“IP” addresses)
49
along with the time and date the alleged infringement took place.
ISPs then cross-reference that data with their own internal databases
to determine which subscriber’s account was assigned that IP address
50
at the relevant time.
The ISP then sends an Alert to that
51
subscriber. These Alerts constitute a graduated response system
that includes “temporary reductions of Internet speeds, redirection to
a landing page until the subscriber contacts the ISP to discuss the
matter or reviews and responds to some educational information
about copyright, or other measures that the ISP may deem necessary
52
to help resolve the matter.”

45.
46.

See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 746–49 (2003).
Represented by the American Association of Independent Music (“A2IM”).
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, Center for Copyright Information 2 (July 6, 2011),
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-ofUnderstanding.pdf [hereinafter MOU].
47. Represented by the Independent Film and Television Alliance (“IFTA”). Id. at 2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. David Kravets, Copyright Scofflaws Beware: ISPs to Begin Monitoring Illicit File
Sharing, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/ispfile-sharing-monitoring/.
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Actual implementation of CAS began as of March 2013—almost
two years since the MOU was signed by the parties and more than
53
five years since initial dialogue and negotiations first began. As a
result, most of the scholarship heretofore in the area of CAS has been
54
Having laid the
speculatively based on the guiding MOU.
groundwork of how CAS came about in Part II, Part III will discuss
the MOU as originally signed and highlight significant lines of
criticism. Part III will discuss the recently publicized implementation
methodology, as detailed by signatories of the MOU.
1. The Center for Copyright Information

Section Two of the Memorandum of Understanding delineates
the creation of the Center for Copyright Information (“CCI”), which
is the private entity charged with the design and management of a
55
Copyright Alert System. Additionally, CCI is tasked with educating
the public about copyright law, online infringement, and the civil and
56
criminal consequences of such infringement.
57
CCI is governed by a six-person Executive Committee. Three
committee members are selected by content rightsholders, and three
58
committee members are selected by the participating ISPs. Initial
59
funding for CCI is also split fifty-fifty between the two groups.
However, there is no public interest or copyright expert
representative on the Executive Committee. Instead, the MOU
creates a separate three-person Advisory Board “drawn from
60
relevant subject matter experts and consumer interest communities.”
As with the Executive Committee, the Advisory Board is
essentially co-governed. Content rightsholders and ISPs each select
one Advisory Board member, and the two selected Advisory Board

53. Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, Congressional Internet
Caucus Meets on Copyright and Piracy, C-SPAN.org (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.
c-span.org/Events/Congressional-Internet-Caucus-Meets-on-Copyright-and-Piracy/107
37438657-1 (Jill Lesser presenting).
54. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes”
Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 28
(2012); generally Mary LaFrance, Graduated Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the
Black Box, 30 CARDOZO ARTS. & ENT. L.J. 165 (2012).
55. MOU, supra note 46, at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 4, 14.
60. Id. at 3–4.

Winter 2014]

NORMATIVE AVOISION

11
61

members select a mutually agreeable third member. The Executive
Committee is obliged to consult with the Advisory Board on any
“significant issues” it is considering regarding the design and
62
implementation of CAS.
Notably, the Advisory Board provides
63
only nonbinding “recommendations” to the Executive Committee.
The MOU envisions that CCI will also retain an Independent
Expert—an “impartial technical expert” that would review on an
ongoing basis the methodology of CAS and make recommendations
“with the goal of ensuring and maintaining confidence on the part of
the Content Owner Representatives, the Participating ISPs, and the
64
public in the accuracy and security of the Methodologies.” Like the
Advisory Board, the Independent Expert’s recommendations are
65
confidential and nonbinding on the Executive Committee. “Failure
to adopt a recommendation of the Independent Expert [does] not
66
amount to a breach under [the MOU].”
This includes those
instances where a particular Content Owner’s methodology is found
67
to be “fundamentally unreliable.”
If a Content Owner Representative Methodology is found by the
Independent Expert to be fundamentally unreliable, the Independent
Expert may issue a confidential finding of inadequacy only to that
68
69
particular content owner.
Notification to participating ISPs,
wrongfully suspected subscribers, or other Content Owners using or
70
contemplating similar methodologies is not required.
2. The Six Strikes Structure

The escalating six-alert structure of CAS is modeled in theory
71
72
after the French HADOPI and Irish Eircom graduated response

61. MOU, supra note 46, at 3.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 5.
69. It is uncertain based on the MOU whether the Independent Expert may disclose a
finding of fundamental inadequacy to just the content rightsholder or also to affected ISPs.
See id. However, participating ISPs other than those ISPs directly affected are expressly
restricted from notice. Id.
70. Id.
71. Lawmakers adopt Internet anti-piracy bill, FRANCE24.COM (May 13, 2009),
http://www.france24.com/en/20090512-lawmakers-adopt-internet-anti-piracy-bill-illegaldownloading-France.
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systems. Under the MOU, content rightsholders send notices of
73
infringement to a subscriber’s ISP. These notices assert ownership
and infringement of a copyrighted work by a subscriber of the ISP
and contain technical information necessary for the ISP to identify
74
the subscriber (e.g., IP address, date, and time). ISPs receive the
notice, match the alleged infringing transaction to their subscriber
75
using the IP address at the relevant time, and generate an alert. Of
note, ISPs are not required to generate alerts above a certain
76
undisclosed notice volume.
Moreover, ISPs have discretion to
temporarily stop processing or reduce the number of ISP Notices
processed if in the sole discretion of the ISP, the resulting demand on
77
their systems and resources becomes unreasonable. Justifications
for finding such an unreasonable demand are remarkably broad and
include disproportionate impact on (1) business processes and
systems, on (2) customer service departments arising from subscriber
inquiries regarding CAS, and any (3) “other demands on the
Participating ISP’s businesses processes and systems” that “must be
78
given precedence.” Thus, individual ISPs have incredible discretion
in how many notices they choose to process and therefore how many
alerts ultimately are sent to subscribers.
Upon processing a valid notice of infringement, ISPs generate
and send one of six escalating copyright alerts to the subscriber. The
six alerts can be divided into three categories: educational measures,
79
acknowledgement measures, and mitigation measures. The first two
80
copyright alerts fall under the umbrella of educational measures.
These alerts are informative in nature and do not require a response
or acknowledgement from the subscriber.
They explain that
copyright infringement is illegal, that there are lawful methods of
obtaining copyrighted content, and that continued infringement will

72. Nate Anderson, Irish ISP agrees to disconnect repeat P2P users, ARS TECHNICA
(Jan. 28, 2009, 11:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/01/irish-isp-agrees-todisconnect-repeat-p2p-users/.
73. MOU, supra note 46, at 6.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. (“[E]ach Participating ISP shall not be required to exceed the notice volumes
pertaining to its Copyright Alert Program as established in Section 5 of this Agreement.”).
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id.
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result in imposition of sanctions in the form of the mitigation
81
measures.
The third and fourth copyright alerts are best characterized as
acknowledgement measures. These alerts require acknowledgement
of receipt but do not require the user to “acknowledge participation
82
in any allegedly infringing activity.”
Acknowledgement does,
however, require that the subscriber agree to immediately stop and/or
instruct others using the subscriber’s account to stop any infringing
83
content. The method of acknowledgement may be in the form of a
temporary landing page requiring a click-through acknowledgement
for subsequent online access; in a pop-up notice that persists
concurrently
with
online
access
until
a
click-through
acknowledgement; or in any other format deemed “reasonable” in
84
the judgment of that ISP.
The last class of copyright alerts, the mitigation measures, are
triggered in the fifth and sixth alerts. As with the third and fourth
copyright alerts, these alerts require acknowledgement of receipt and
after a fourteen day notice period, apply one of several measures: a
temporary reduction in bandwidth speed, a temporary step-down in
service tier, a temporary redirection to a landing page until subscriber
contacts an ISP customer service representative or completes
“educational instruction on copyright,” a temporary suspension of
Internet access, or any other temporary mitigation measure designed
85
by an ISP that is “designed to be comparable.” Note that after the
sixth alert has been sent, the ISP is not obligated to send further alerts
to the subscriber but must keep count of additional notices sent from
86
content rightsholders.
Additionally, the alert system effectively
resets once an ISP does not receive a notice relating to a subscriber’s
87
account within twelve months from the last notice.
3. Appeal Process

Before any mitigation measure in the fifth and sixth copyright
alerts is applied, the subscriber has fourteen days to appeal via a

81. MOU, supra note 46, at 8.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 11–12.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id. (“The ISP must “expunge all prior ISP Notices and Copyright Alerts from the
Subscriber’s account.”).
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nonjudicial dispute resolution program. The appeal process, known
as the “Independent Review Program,” is initiated by a subscriber
upon receipt of a mitigation alert and payment of a $35 dollar filing
89
fee.
Each appeal is decided by an individual “independent
reviewer” selected by an Administrating Organization from a panel
90
of neutral reviewers. The legal principles applied in the independent
review process is the “prevailing law as determined by United States
91
federal courts,” including such concepts as fair use. These principles
are determined for all independent reviewers by an “independent”
copyright expert, who is suggested by the Administrating
92
Organization and approved by the CCI Executive Committee.
The MOU allows for just six limited grounds for review of a
mitigation measure alert:
(1) account misidentification; (2)
unauthorized account use; (3) authorized content use; (4) fair use; (5)
93
file misidentification; and (6) work published before 1923. Under
the appeal process, the subscriber carries the burden of proof to
94
disprove a presumption of infringement.
B. Critiques of the Original MOU

The original Memorandum of Understanding was undoubtedly
written with the goal in mind of giving CCI substantial discretion in
setting up the implementation of the Copyright Alert System.
Despite this fact, numerous criticisms of the MOU and CAS in
general have abounded. This Part will focus on five potential issues
in the MOU: (1) education as a goal; (2) the power of the advisory
board; (3) the neutrality of the Independent Expert and the
Copyright Expert; (4) the severity of mitigation measures; and (5) the
95
limited defenses in the Independent Review Process.
First, one of the many goals of Copyright Alert System and CCI
96
includes “educat[ing]” consumers.
The MOU requires that CCI

88. MOU, supra note 46, at 14, 30.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 31.
91. Id. at 35.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 26.
94. Id. at 27.
95. This review will be particularly succinct given the “updated” CAS
implementation that deviates somewhat from the original MOU.
96. MOU, supra note 46, at 2 (The goals of the Copyright Alert System and CCI
include “providing education, privacy protection, fair warning, and an opportunity for
review that protects the lawful interests of consumers.”).
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develop and host online educational programs designed to “inform
the public about laws prohibiting [o]nline [i]nfringement and lawful
means available to obtain digital works online and through other
97
legitimate means.” Because CAS has often been characterized as
“private legislation,” it is especially important that any “educational”
materials be accurate and provide neutral information. Critics have
expressed doubt about CCI’s ability to educate the public in an
unbiased fashion.
A review of CCI’s website in late 2012 is telling and reinforces
those doubts. If the official CAS website is an indication of the type
of education materials to be bundled with alerts and mitigation
measures, then CAS will be replete with big-media rhetoric. The
educational resources available lack a balanced and objective
viewpoint, and resemble indoctrination more than education.
At the time, the CAS website contained a “facts” section that
listed a number of curious and outlandish dangers associated with
peer-to-peer file sharing. For example, file sharing places “sensitive
data” such as “personal health information,” “financial records,” and
98
“classified documents” at risk.
File sharing “means viruses . . .
99
spyware and malware.” CCI also appealed to the universal refrain
to “save the children” when it alleged that CAS was a way for
children to be protected because parents cannot “know everything
100
that kids are viewing or downloading.”
Such “education” could
apply equally as well to the use of standard email and therefore
should not be considered relevant within the goals and ambit of CAS,
CCI, and the MOU.
CAS further utilizes the “copyright infringement as theft”
rhetoric that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected. In its
facts section, CCI states:
“[O]nly 40 percent of Americans
understood the serious legal consequences associated with the
distribution of copyrighted content. That compares with the 78
percent who understood the serious legal consequences of shoplifting
101
a DVD from the local video store.” In direct contrast, the Supreme
Court has stated that “infringement plainly implicates a more
complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft,

97. MOU, supra note 46, at 4.
98. Facts, COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/facts
(last visited May 12, 2012) (Note that the page has since been taken down.).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
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conversion, or fraud.”
If CCI and its independent expert on
copyright believe this is an accurate description of “prevailing legal
principles,” then “education” in the MOU truly means anything but.
Similarly, CCI declared that “copyright harms the economy,”
destroyed 373,000 American jobs, and deprived states of “badly
103
needed . . . tax revenue.” Such language is reminiscent of big media
rhetoric and shows considerable bias in ignoring the causative versus
correlative issues inherent in such a statement. Obviously, a
multitude of factors could have resulted or contributed to a loss of
jobs in the entertainment industry, including the recent global
recession of 2008.
Second, the Advisory Board wields very little substantive power
104
by the terms of the MOU. There is no guarantee of any role for the
Advisory Board in decisions it may deem “significant” unless the
105
Executive Committee also considers such an issue “significant.”
The Executive Committee could therefore exclude the Advisory
board simply by declining to find a particular decision “significant.”
The Advisory Board has no veto power, even if unanimous in its
decisions. Furthermore, there is a lack of process information
concerning how long Advisory Board members serve or if they could
106
be replaced by the Executive Committee or parties to the MOU. In
short, under the terms of the MOU, the Advisory Board has the
potential to act as nothing more than a public relations construct to
which CCI can attribute efforts to “protect the lawful interest of
107
consumers.”
Third, the MOU does not ensure the neutrality or the
effectiveness of the Independent Expert and the independent
copyright and privacy experts who are to review the CAS
methodology and establish the legal principles under which the
Independent Review Process will take place. Any recommendations
108
these experts make are confidential and nonbinding. The Executive
Committee need not attempt to comply with these recommendations
nor to document their reasoning behind such a decision, such as in a
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, the Advisory Board has
no material authority with regards to expert selection: CCI’s
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 218 (1985).
Facts, supra note 98.
LaFrance, supra note 54, at 169–171; Bridy, supra note 54, at 28.
LaFrance, supra note 54, at 169–171.
Id. at 170.
See MOU, supra note 46, at 1–2.
See id. at 5.
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Executive Board, i.e., the parties to the MOU, has the sole discretion
109
to choose these experts. Lastly, there is no provision that precludes
CCI from replacing any experts with whom they disagree. Thus, as
with the Advisory Board, the Executive Committee of CCI has
arranged for expert resources to be at its disposal but has
handicapped those very same experts from performing their duties.
Fourth, the severity and proportionality of the mitigation
measures has been met with considerable and widespread disapproval
in the public eye. Under the MOU, ISPs may suspend a subscriber’s
110
access during the fifth and sixth Mitigation Alerts. An ISP may also
terminate the access of a subscriber who receives a Mitigation Alert
111
or further ISP Notices after a Mitigation Alert.
Civil liberties
groups have expressed concern that CAS could result in the denial of
basic rights to access. The importance of Internet access in today’s
world means “your access to the world’s information and also your
112
right to speak to the world.”
Accordingly, “it would be wrong for
any ISP to cut off subscribers’ Internet access, even temporarily,
113
based on allegations that have not been tested in court.”
In short,
denying access to what is already or is developing into a basic right
should require proper due process and depend on assertions triable in
114
a court or other governmental adjudication.
Fifth, the Independent Review Process allows for just six limited
grounds for review of a mitigation measure alert: (1) account
misidentification; (2) unauthorized account use; (3) authorized
content use; (4) fair use; (5) file misidentification; and (6) work
115
published before 1923. Generally, these limited defenses have been
criticized as overly narrow and restrictive, especially in light of the
116
presumption of infringement. For example, Annemarie Bridy notes
that in an account misidentification defense, “copyright owners under
the MOU enjoy a rebuttable presumption of correctness as long as
their method of capturing IP addresses was not found to be

109. MOU, supra note 46, at 5.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id. at 7, 9, 13.
112. Smith & Fowler, supra note 35 (quoting Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst with
the ACLU in Washington).
113. David Sohn, ISPs and Copryight Owners Strike a Deal, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (July 7, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/davidsohn/isps-and-copyright-owners-strike-deal.
114. Id.
115. MOU, supra note 46, at 26.
116. See Bridy, supra note 54, at 34–37; LaFrance, supra note 54, at 175–179.
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‘fundamentally unreliable’ by CCI’s independent technical expert.”
Mary LaFrance finds significant omissions in that the listed grounds
for review “do not even come close to encompassing the range of
118
lawful uses for P2P file-sharing.” LaFrance has compiled a list of
omitted legal grounds for noninfringement that should likewise apply
to the CAS Independent Review Process, including fair use, works
with copyrights forfeited due to publication without notice, and
119
authorization by a licensee of the content in question. For instance,
under CAS, a work qualifying as fair use in an infringement suit, such
as a parody, satire, mash-up or commentary, could trigger a Notice
and Mitigation Alert, since a substantial portion of the work could
120
consist of copyrighted content. In such cases, the subscriber should
be entitled to assert fair use, in any shape or form accepted by federal
courts, as valid grounds for appeal.
The CAS MOU essentially set forth a broad set of guidelines
that CCI would be held to operate within. Much ink was spilled
considering the ramifications of the MOU as a guiding document, but
until March 2013 when the Copyright Alert System entered active
121
implementation, little was known about how CAS would operate in
122
practice.
C. Above and Beyond the Original MOU
The “[The Copyright Alert System] has the potential to be an
important educational vehicle that will help reduce peer-to-peer
online copyright infringement. Whether it will meet that
promise or instead will undermine the rights of Internet users
123
will depend on how it is implemented.”

Despite the MOU being signed by all parties in July 2011, details
about the specific implementation of CAS, including its Notice
discovery methodology as well as its Independent Review Process,
were largely unavailable prior to when CAS was in fact rolled out by
CCI in March 2013. This Part will summarize the new information on
Bridy, supra note 54, at 35.
LaFrance, supra, note 54, at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 174.
See FIRST AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1,
COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/02/CCI-MOU-First-Amendment.pdf (last visited May 1, 2013).
122. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 904–05 (2012).
123. Sohn, supra note, at 113.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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CAS released primarily in a Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory
Committee meeting and in a U.C. Hastings Conference on the
124
Copyright Alert System. Additionally, this Part will focus primarily
on MPAA methodology, as provided by MPAA Senior Vice
125
President Marianne Grant.
The CAS methodology involves, sequentially: notice generation;
notice validation; ISP alert discretion, generation, and conveyance;
and the Independent Review Process. During the notice generation
phase, content rightsholders will employ an independent contractor
(“Scanning Vendor”) to monitor peer-to-peer (“P2P”) online file
sharing. That Scanning Vendor, announced to be MarkMonitor Inc.,
will monitor and search for online file sharing via the BitTorrent
126
protocol.
Content rightsholders will provide a database of titles, focusing
primarily on recent and popular works, to the Scanning Vendor. This
database will contain titles, keywords, and unique digital IDs
embedded in the content—allowing the Scanning Vendor to properly
ascertain whether a file shared is in fact on the list of monitored titles.
The Scanning Vendor operates simply as a peer node in the P2P
network, although virtual servers will enable the Scanning Vendor to
operate many peer nodes concurrently. While acting as a peer node,
the Scanning Vendor will then record and connect to the list of peers
sharing content.
Prior to packaging and submitted the Notice to an ISP, the
Scanning Vendor must verify the content and the infringer. In order
127
to verify the content, the Scanning Vendor uses a hashing algorithm
to create a ‘digital fingerprint” of the shared file. If the hash is new to
the database, the Scanning Vendor downloads the entire file for

124. Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, supra note 54 (MPAA Vice
President Marianne Grant describing the Copyright Alert System as currently
implemented); UC Hastings Conference on Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: The
Copyright Alert System, UC Hastings College of the Law (Mar. 29, 2013) [hereinafter,
U.C. Hastings Conference]; Sarah Laskow, The new copyright alert system is running,
CJR.ORG (Feb. 28, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.cjr.org/cloud_control/cas_system_
already_in_action.php?page=all&print=true.
125. U.C. Hastings Conference, supra note 125. Nevertheless, Grant has assured the
public that the RIAA methodology is substantially similar. Id.
126. On behalf of the RIAA, MarkMonitor will also monitor Gnutella and other P2P
platforms other than BitTorrent. Id.
127. “A hash function is any algorithm or subroutine that maps data sets of variable
length to data sets of a fixed length.” Hash Function, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_function (last visited Nov 17, 2013).
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manual verification. During manual verification, a person watches
and reviews the file, comparing its content, size, etc. to a master file.
If the hash is already in the database, the file is presumed verified.
In order to “verify” the infringer—i.e., confirm that the alleged
infringer is actually uploading pieces of the content in question—the
Scanning Vendor utilizes rudimentary network diagnostic tools such
as ping and traceroute to ensure that the IP address is “live” at that
time. Presumably, this step addresses the proven risk of innocent
129
persons being framed as infringers. For example, researchers were
“able to generate hundreds of DMCA takedown notices for
[computers at the University of Washington] that were not
130
downloading or sharing any content.”
Once the content and IP
address are verified, the Scanning Vendor packages the evidence—
including date, time, IP, ping and traceroute results, and shared
content files or pieces—and delivers it to the ISP that controls that
particular IP address.
The ISP uses the IP address and date and time records to match
the Notice to one of their Subscribers. At this point, the ISP
determines whether or not the seven-day grace period following a
previous Alert is in effect. If a grace period is not in effect, the ISP
generates and sends an Alert to the Subscriber.
In the case that the Alert is the fifth or sixth Mitigation Alert, the
Subscriber has the option of pursuing an appeal via the Independent
Review Process.
The information available regarding the
Independent Review Process remains largely the same as during the
signing of the MOU, except for two items. First, the MOU was
amended in October 2012 to include provisions that allowed the
voiding of previous Copyright Alerts, if an appeal of the fifth
Mitigation Alert is successful.
Second, the Administrating
Organization for the Independent Review Process has been selected.
The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), an established and
respected dispute resolution organization, will be overseeing the
Independent Review process. The choice of AAA will contribute to

128. The RIAA does not employ manual verification, relying instead on automated
audio fingerprinting tools. U.C. Hastings Conference, supra note 125.
129. Michael Piatek, Tadayoshi Kohno, & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Challenges and
Directions for Monitoring P2P File Sharing Networks –or– Why My Printer Received
a DMCA Takedown Notice, 1-3, available at http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/dmca_hot
sec08.pdf
130. Id. at 1.
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the perception that CCI truly intends for the Independent Review
131
Process to be fair and neutral.

IV. The Proposal: Normative Avoision
Content rightsholders have spearheaded a legal campaign that,
though highly successful in the courts, has resulted in significant
normative backlash and overall has been counterproductive to their
intended goal of increased copyright enforcement. With the signing
of the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of Understanding,
content rightsholders seemed poised to make that same mistake
again. Fortunately, it appears as though the content industry is
coming to realize that normative overdeterrence is causing more
132
harm to its business than good. In its many significant changes to
the Copyright Alert System since the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding, CCI and by extension content rightsholders, have
deftly handled the very real threat of a normative backlash.
In the copyright litigation campaign, widespread noncompliance
fueled by normative viewpoints and overdeterrent enforcement
resulted in a “copyright backlash” that undermined support for
133
content rightsholders’ pro-copyright goals.
With the Copyright
Alert System, that same widespread noncompliance remains
134
present. And initially, content rightsholders drafted CAS in a way
135
reminiscent of their overdeterrent litigation campaign. In doing so,
rightsholders ran the very real risk of once again creating normative
backlash effects that would frustrate their goal of reducing file sharing
infringement. However, following hard on the heels of failed procopyright legislative endeavors, a popular shift in normative
136
awareness and values has taken place.
In response, content
rightsholders have finally taken note of the normative consequences

131. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 182.
132. See Peter S. Menell, Infringement Conflation, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1578 (2012)
(“The recording industry has come to recognize that mass enforcement is causing more
harm to its business than good under current circumstances.”); Sarah McBride & Ethan
Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html; see also Greg Sandoval, Jammie
Thomas Rejects RIAA’s $25,000 Settlement Offer, CNET NEWS (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:00 AM
PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10442482-261.html; cf. Depoorter, et al., supra
note 1, at 1283–89 (arguing that enforcement-based strategies seeking disproportionate
sanctions are counterproductive for deterring file sharing of copyrighted works).
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See supra Part II.A
135. See supra Part III.B.
136. See infra Part IV.A.

22

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:1

of their enforcement methods and, through subsequent changes to
CAS, have deftly sidestepped the normative backlash dilemma.
A. The Normative Shift

In the last three years, several unsuccessful legislative campaigns
spearheaded by content rightsholders have brought to light for the
general public the fact that copyright law is sometimes driven by the
137
self-interested efforts of the content industry. The seminal example
occurred in late 2011, just after the parties to CAS signed the MOU.
Content rightsholders introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act
(“SOPA”) in the Congressional House of Representatives.
Opposition to the bill was powerful and occurred in speed and
138
Mark Lemley derided the bills as
numbers never before seen.
“pos[ing] grave constitutional problems and . . . potentially disastrous
consequences for the stability and security of the Internet’s
addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that has
helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free
139
expression.” Wikipedia, Google, Facebook, Twitter, and over 7,000
other websites protested by “blacking out” their services as a
140
demonstration against the potential censorship embodied in SOPA.
Three million people emailed Congress to voice their opposition, and
141
In the
more than four million signed a petition opposing SOPA.
resulting groundswell, lawmaker after lawmaker renounced support
for the legislation, and the bill was subsequently dropped from
142
consideration.

137. Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (2010).
138. Timothy B. Lee, SOPA protest by the numbers: 162M pageviews, 7 million
signatures, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/01/sopa-protest-by-the-numbers-162m-pageviews-7-million-signatures/.
139. Mark Lemley, et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34
(December 19, 2011), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dont-breakinternet.
140. Rob Waugh, U.S Senators withdraw support for anti-piracy bills as 4.5 million
people sign Google’s anti-censorship petition, DAILYMAIL.CO.UK (Jan 22, 2011),
www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2088860/SOPA-protest-4-5m-people-sign-Googlesanti-censorship-petition.html (“Wikipedia’s ‘blackout’ protest against the U.S. anti-piracy
bills SOPA and PIPA has ignited a wave of protest around the world – and up to 18
senators have publicly withdrawn support for the anti-piracy bills, after 7,000 sites ‘blacked
out’, and protestors took to the streets in New York.”).
141. Id. See also Jenna Wortham, Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Bills Began as GrassRoots Grumbling, NYTIMES.ORG (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/
technology/public-outcry-over-antipiracy-bills-began-as-grass-roots-grumbling.html.
142. Wortham, supra note 141.
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Post-SOPA, the public began to pay more attention to the legal
and legislative campaigns of content rightsholders. A significant
portion of the public began to believe that their social norms were not
143
reflected in existing copyright law.
Critics assessed the copyright
landscape and found that a handful of outsized content intermediaries
lobbied fiercely “to arrive at copyright laws that enrich[] established
copyright industries at the expense of both creators and the general
144
public.”
Jessica Litman observed that “[c]opyright lobbyists have
not shown that recent enhancements to copyright have made it easier
or more rewarding for readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy
145
copyrighted works.”
In the public debate that followed, a number of pro-copyright
enforcement arguments were shown to be lacking.
Content
rightsholders’ contention that the “sky is falling”—that new
technologies were destroying established content industries and
eliminating all incentives to create—is a prime example. Several
studies came to light that questioned the data cited by content
rightsholders to support their claims. In its April 2010 report on
“Intellectual Property: Observations on Efforts to Quantify the
Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,” the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) questioned the metrics
and methodology used to support the existence of a growing file
146
sharing problem. The GAO investigation found that the reported
damages to the American economy “[could not] be substantiated or
147
traced back to an underlying data source or methodology.” A 2012
study showed that U.S. consumers spent more on entertainment
148
today than they did 10 years prior. Conflicting anecdotal evidence
from some content rightsholders also painted the pro-copyright
movement in a favorable light. Indeed, Jim Griffin, a former head of

143. See, e.g., Peter Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 881, 938 (2011) (“Many [digital natives] do not share the norms reflected in
existing copyright law. Many of them also do not understand copyright law or see the
benefits of complying with it.”).
144. Litman, supra note 137, at 7.
145. Id. at 29.
146. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-423, Intellectual Property:
Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated
Goods 18 (2010); Casey Rae-Hunter, Better Mousetraps: Licensing, Access, and Innovation
in the New Music Marketplace, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 35, 67 (2012).
147. Rae-Hunter, supra note 146, at 43; see generally GAO-10-423, supra note 146.
148. Michael Masnick & Michael Ho, THE SKY IS RISING 3 (2012), http://gigaom2.
files.wordpress.com/2012/01/theskyisrising.pdf (“By any measure, it appears that we are
living in a true Renaissance era for content.”).
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technology at Geffen Records candidly noted that “[i]n the history of
intellectual property, the things we thought would kill us are the
149
things that fed us.” Peter Yu explains that these new technologies
have generally “open[ed] up new markets for [the content
150
rightsholders’] products and services.”
Additionally, the rise and prevalence of file sharing today has
enabled an upsurge in the number of remix and mashup works, and
151
consequently the popularity of such works.
Unsurprisingly, the
public has, at least at the margin, internalized the pro file sharing
norms enabling remixed works.
Furthermore, though content rightsholders’ have long claimed
152
that copyright infringement is tantamount to theft, the Supreme
Court has stated that copyright infringement is fundamentally
different than theft because a copyright infringer neither “assumes
153
physical control” nor “wholly deprive[s] its owner of use.”
Some
content rightsholders’ have gone so far as to mischaracterize court
decisions as “consistently rul[ing] personal file sharing is a copyright
154
infringement and therefore . . . a crime.”
Instead of sympathizing with content rightsholders’ file-sharingas-theft rhetoric, the public has started to consider that “right holders
should start by abandoning their old business models and adapting
155
them to the new digital reality.”
Increasingly, the public is
displaying a willingness to adopt new and innovative legitimate
services—combinations of “technical innovation, [convenient] access
to the underlying delivery mechanisms, and reasonable licensing
terms”—as solutions within their normative viewpoints and that
156
therefore “serve musicians, rights-holders, and music fans.” Netflix
and Spotify, buffet-structured online streaming platforms for video

149. J.D. Lasica, DARKNET: HOLLYWOOD’S WAR AGAINST THE DIGITAL
GENERATION 109 (2005).
150. Yu, supra note 143, at 887.
151. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the
Hybrid Economy 24–25 (2008).
152. What
is
Online
Piracy,
RIAA.com,
http://www.riaa.com/
physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=What-is-Online-Piracy, (last visited June 5, 2012)
(characterizing file sharing as “music theft”).
153. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217–18.
154. The Law, RIAA.com, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=
piracy_online_the_law, (last visited June 5, 2012).
155. Eldar Haber, Copyrights in the Stream: The Battle on Webcasting, 28 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 769, 772 (2012).
156. Rae-Hunter, supra note 146, at 43–44.
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and music respectively, are highly successful examples of the public
adopting licensed content platforms, within this normative structure.
Thus, content rightsholders’ face the difficult proposition of
trying to increase effective copyright enforcement via the Copyright
Alert System in an environment which has recently seen the tide flow
in favor of pro file sharing social norms.
B. Avoiding a Normative Backlash

Between the time of the original parties signing the MOU and
the implementation of CAS today, content rightsholders have
changed much in the structure, methodology, and standards of the
Copyright Alert System. To be sure, CCI has done much to dispel
157
the many criticisms associated with the original MOU.
First, this
Part will address the success with which CCI has addressed these
critiques, many of which are deeply supported in the new normative
framework. Second, this Part examines content rightsholders’ split
enforcement regime—separately targeting uninitiated versus frequent
file sharers—and proposes that such a system abides well within the
new normative shift.
Accordingly, content rightsholders’ new
Copyright Alert System may very well prove successful, increasing
enforcement in such a way as to minimize normative backlash
amongst the majority of the general public.
In Part II.B. this article reviewed five potential issues in the
original MOU: (1) education as a goal, (2) the power of the advisory
board, (3) the neutrality of the Independent Expert and the
Copyright Expert, (4) the severity of mitigation measures, and (5) the
limited defenses in the Independent Review Process. As CAS goes
into active implementation, CCI has arguably addressed three of
these issues.
First, and perhaps most significant as it reflects on the integrity of
CAS, the “education” rhetoric has been significantly amended. In a
March 2013 panel for the Congressional Internet Caucus Committee,
CCI Executive Director Jill Lesser emphasized CCI’s focus not on
enforcement and punishments but on neutral education and
158
“chang[ing] attitudes.”
Lesser noted that the CCI website, and
especially the educational “fact” section, had been significantly
159
Gone is the language characterizing file sharing as
improved.

157.
158.
159.

See supra Part III.C.
Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, supra note 53.
Id.
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160

outright criminal “theft.”
Gone are the threats that file sharing
161
Gone is the appeal to
“means” viruses, spyware, and malware.
162
“save the children” through CAS.
Instead, the CCI site focuses
163
164
primarily on what copyright is, how CAS works, and where to find
165
convenient and legal access to content.
Second, CCI is (slowly) moving to correct a blunder in which it
hired arguably biased firm Stroz Friedberg as its “Independent”
Technical Expert. On October 18, 2012, CCI announced that Stroz
166
Friedberg would serve as the CAS Independent Technical Expert.
Days later, news outlets broke the story that the firm Stroz Friedberg
167
had formerly been a lobbyist for the RIAA. CCI “drew immediate
fire from critics who rightfully questioned the firm's ability to be truly
independent in light of its past paid advocacy for corporate rights
168
owners.” CCI promptly responded by announcing that they would
hire another expert to review Stroz Friedberg’s initial evaluation of
169
the CAS methodology. Here, CCI’s quick response does much to
170
allay concerns about the legitimacy of CAS.
Third, CCI has repeatedly declared that termination of a
subscriber’s service is not required and is not the ultimate goal of

160. See Facts, supra note 98.
161. See Facts, supra note 98.
162. See id.
163. Resources & FAQ, COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.copyrightinformation.
org/resources-faq/what-is-copyright/ (last visited May 1, 2013).
164. The Copyright Alert System, COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.
copyrightinformation.org/ the-copyright-alert-system (last visited May 1, 2013).
165. A Better Way to Find Movies, TV & Music, COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG,
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/a-better-way-to-find-movies-tv-music (last visited
May 1, 2013).
166. See Ernesto, Six-Strikes “Independent Expert” Is RIAA’s Former Lobbying Firm,
TORRENTFREAK.COM (Oct. 22, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/six-strikes-independentexpert-is-riaas-former-lobbying-firm-121022 (reporting on Stroz Friedberg’s prior business
relationship with the RIAA).
167. Id.
168. Bridy, supra note 55, at 30.
169. Ernesto, Six Strikes” Evidence Re-reviewed to Fix RIAA Lobbying Controversy,
TORRENTFREAK.COM (Oct. 31, 2012), torrentfreak.com/six-strikes-evidence-re-reviewedto-fix-riaa-lobbying-controversy-121031 (“We are sensitive to any appearance that Stroz
lacks independence, and so CCI has decided to have another expert review Stroz’s initial
evaluation of the content community’s processes. We will be selecting the additional
expert promptly and will make that information available.”).
170. However, as of March 8, 2013, the additional independent technical expert has
not yet been named. Ernesto, “Six Strikes” Evidence Still Waiting for Impartial Re-review,
TORRENTFREAK.COM (Mar. 8, 2013), torrentfreak.com/six-strikes-evidence-still-waitingfor-impartial-reexamination-130308.
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171

CAS.
CCI leaves the specific choice and implementation of
172
Cablevision is the only major
Mitigation Measure up to the ISP.
ISP that will completely suspend (for 24 hours) customers’ Internet
service. Verizon is the only ISP that will cap customers’ data speeds
173
under CAS. Thus, CCI has placated criticisms of normatively unfair
and disproportionate sanctions, such as complete termination of basic
rights of access to the Internet.
Admittedly, CCI has not addressed the power of the Advisory
Board or the limited defenses available in the Independent Review
Process. On the whole, however, CCI has made some effort to
address and stay within the ambits of the new normative shift.
Accordingly, at least for the majority of the public, the level of
enforcement associated with the Copyright Alert System is likely not
excessive enough to trigger a normative backlash.
However, content rightsholders recognize that this normatively
compliant version of CAS will likely not “be able to deal with the
174
hard-core infringers” and “is not likely to change that behavior.”
Content rightsholders have reserved the possibility that [content
rightsholders] would sue those it suspected of habitual piracy, as it did
175
roughly 35,000 people between 2003 and 2008.”
Content
rightsholders have thus effectively adopted a split enforcement effort
that focuses litigation on frequent file sharers with deeply internalized
pro-sharing norms, and pro-copyright education on nascent to
moderate file sharers who have not yet deeply internalized prosharing norms.
And so this article comes full circle to Professor Depoorter’s
suggestion to content rightsholders in Copyright Backlash:
“[E]nforcement efforts would likely be more effective if targeted
specifically to different types of copyright offenders.” Content
rightsholders have listened. This new split enforcement regime,
consisting of the Copyright Alert System and reserved litigation, has
the potential to not only avoid a normative backlash effect but to
promote pro-copyright norms among occasional infringers. In light of
content rightsholders recent litigation and legislative campaign
debacles, the Copyright Alert System represents a new hope for their
pro-copyright efforts.
171. Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, supra note 53.
172. Alex Fitzpatrick, ISPs Finally Explain How ‘Six Strikes’ Anti-Piracy Program Will
Work, MASHABLE.COM (Feb. 27, 2013), www.mashable.com/2013/02/27/isps-six-strikes.
173. Id.
174. Smith & Fowler, supra note 35; U.C. Hastings Conference, supra note 125.
175. Smith & Fowler, supra note 35.
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C. Issues Beyond Backlash

Though this concludes the normative backlash and normative
avoision analysis, this article does not suggest that all substantive
issues with the Copyright Alert System have been resolved. For
example, questions remain regarding the validity of CAS as “private
176
legislation,” whether ISPs are sufficiently adversarial to content
177
rightsholders to ensure safeguards for the public, the government’s
role in pushing ISPs towards a private solution for content
178
rightsholders, and whether the process from start to continued
179
implementation is sufficiently transparent. These questions persist
but exist outside the scope of this article.

176. “[S]tate-promoted private ordering represents a species of policymaking that is
insulated from public scrutiny and that can be tailored, by virtue of that insulation, to
serve corporate interests at the public’s expense.” Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the
Specter of Graduated Response, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 559, 578 (2011).
177. Many believe reducing online traffic in an effort to curb bandwidith infrastructure
costs are the primary motivator behind ISPs backing CAS. Larry Dignan, Why RIAA, ISP
Cooperation May Deliver Returns for Both Sides, ZDNET.COM (Jan. 29, 2009, 3:33 AM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/why-riaa-isp-cooperation-may-deliver-returns-for-bothsides/11893; Greg Sandoval, Comcast, Cox Cooperating with RIAA in Antipiracy
Campaign, CNETNEWS.COM (Mar. 25, 2009, 9:49 AM), http://news.cnet.com/83011023_3-10204047-93.html; John M. Owen, Graduated Response Systems and the Market for
Copyrighted Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 559, 583 (2012); see ENVISIONAL,
TECHNICAL REPORT: AN ESTIMATE OF INFRINGING USE OF THE INTERNET (Jan. 2011),
available at http:// documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-Jan2011.pdf
(reporting that the transmission of infringing material accounts for about a quarter of all
Internet traffic); see also Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private
Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 86 (2010) (“[T]he decision
of broadband providers to implement intelligent network technology to gain greater
control over the traffic that crosses their networks. Considering these consequences, it
may be no more than prudent from a liability standpoint for broadband operators to
engage with content owners in a renegotiation of the division of labor for online copyright
enforcement.”). Note that historically ISPs have not sided with content rightsholders. See
Smith & Fowler, supra note 35 (“The cooperation between media and technology
companies represents a shift in a relationship that had been a contentious one. . . . But as
illegal movie downloaders started to strain their networks ISPs grew more willing to clamp
down.”); see, e.g., MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE at 2, AF Holdings, LLC v. Comcast Cable Communications, No. 12-C3516 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2012), (“[P]laintiffs should not be allowed to profit from unfair
litigation tactics whereby they use the offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to gain
Doe defendants’ personal information and coerce ‘settlements’ from them.”).
178. “President Barack Obama’s administration reportedly threatened ISPs with
legislation that would mandate termination of the accounts of users accused of intellectual
property infringement and also blocking of infringing content itself, as a cudgel to press
providers to agree to implement these measures voluntarily. The resulting agreement
between ISPs and content providers was negotiated, if not in the shadow of the law, then
in the threat of such shadow.” Bambauer, supra note 123, at 896.
179. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 167 (focusing transparency and public participation as
missing from the development of CAS).
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V. Conclusion
Previously, content rightsholders spearheaded a legal campaign
that, though highly successful in the courts, has resulted in significant
normative backlash and overall has been counterproductive to their
intended goal of increased copyright enforcement. With the signing
of the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of Understanding,
content rightsholders seemed poised to make that same mistake
again. In a prime example of what this article has termed “normative
avoision,” content rightsholders have finally taken note of the
normative consequences of their enforcement methods and, through
subsequent changes to CAS, have deftly sidestepped the normative
backlash dilemma.
Content rightsholders’ split enforcement regime—separately
targeting uninitiated versus frequent file sharers—proposes a system
that abides well within the new normative shift. Content rightsholders
have thus effectively adopted a split enforcement effort that focuses
litigation on frequent file sharers with deeply internalized pro-sharing
norms, and pro-copyright education on nascent to moderate file
sharers who have not yet deeply internalized pro-sharing norms.
Accordingly, content rightsholders’ new Copyright Alert System may
very well prove successful, increasing enforcement in such a way as to
minimize normative backlash amongst the majority of the general
public. In light of content rightsholders recent litigation and
legislative campaign debacles, the Copyright Alert System represents
a new hope for their pro-copyright efforts.

